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INDEMNIFICATION OF DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS
AGAINST LIABILITIES IMPOSED UNDER
FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS
INTRODUCMION
Indemnification of directors and officers against liabilities incurred as
a consequence of their position as corporate managers is commonly pro-
vided for in the bylaws of corporations and is regulated by state corpora-
tion statutes.' The broad indemnification provisions of the Revised
Model Business Corporation Act (RMBCA)2 have been substantially
adopted by state legislatures, including Wisconsin. Thus, the trend in
indemnification has been expansion of director and officer rights.4 How-
ever, this expanded application of corporate indemnification has not
proceeded unchecked. The scope of permissible indemnification against
certain liabilities is subject to constraints imposed through government
regulation and public policy.5
The competing concerns involving whether to permit indemnification
in the corporate setting are: (1) protection of the system of corporate
governance; (2) protection of the corporation and its stakeholders; and
(3) protection of directors and officers.6 The Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) has posited that indemnification of corporate man-
1. JOSEPH W. BISHOP, JR., THE LAW OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DiRcrORs: INDEM-
NIFICATION AND INSURANCE chs. 6-7 (1982 & Supp. 1994) (reviewing state corporation stat-
utes regulating indemnification); see also Wis. STAT. §§ 180.0850-180.0859 (1991-92).
2. See Robert S. Lavet, Indemnification of Corporate Directors and Officers in Insider
Trading Litigation, 19 SEC. REG. L. J. 402,410 n.25, 411 (1992) (noting the liberal standard for
permissive indemnification of RMBCA § 8.51(a)(2)).
3. BISHOP, supra note 1, 6.85 (Wisconsin's statutory scheme follows the RMBCA, but
with several unique features); see also W-LIAM E. KNEPPER & DAN A. BArLEY, LLAmirry OF
COR'ORATm OFFCERs AND DuEcroRs § 20.04 (4th ed. 1988) (twenty-two states pattern their
indemnification statutes on the 1980 amendments of the Model Act or the 1984 RMBCA).
4. See KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 3, § 20.04.
5. Limits on indemnification may be codified or uncodified. See infra note 35 (providing
examples of each).
6. JOHN F. OLSON & JOSIAH 0. HATCH I, DIRECrOR & OFFICER LiAnmrrY: INDEMNIF-
CATION AND INSURANCE § 4.04[1] (1990); see also Joseph F. Johnston Jr., Corporate Indemni-
fication and Liability Insurance for Directors and Officers, 33 Bus. LAW. 1993 (1978)
(discussing fundamental policy concerns of indemnification).
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agers for liabilities imposed by the federal securities laws is against pub-
lic policy, and any such agreement is unenforceable.7 This position is
premised on the view that securities laws are intended to stimulate dili-
gence and deter violations, and that indemnification would undermine
these objectives.'
In 1987, the Wisconsin legislature adopted an indemnification provi-
sion in its Business Corporation Laws which provides that the public pol-
icy of Wisconsin permits corporate indemnification against liabilities
imposed under federal securities laws. 9 The express policy provision is
unique' 0 and has not been directly opposed by the SEC or challenged in
court." However, Wisconsin law is in apparent conflict with the SEC
policy regarding indemnification. This Comment suggests an appropri-
ate balance for permissible indemnification based on prevailing law and
policy considerations.
Using the Wisconsin corporate indemnification statutes as an exam-
ple, Part I of this Comment examines corporate indemnity law and the
policy concerns promoting state-regulated indemnification. Part II ana-
lyzes the SEC position on indemnification and its application to public
corporations, followed by a discussion in Part III of the standard for fed-
eral preemption of state indemnity laws. Part IV reviews the judiciary's
attempt at resolving the conflict and its response to the SEC position.
Finally, in light of the precedent and policy, Part V provides an appropri-
ate resolution of the conflict and a standard for permissible indemnifica-
tion is submitted.
I. CoRPoRATE INDEMNITY LAW
Indemnification of directors and officers through the use of corporate
funds is one of the primary means of protecting managers against liabili-
7. Items 510, 512 of Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.510, 229.512(h)(3) (1994); see also
BISHOP, supra note 1, 9.05 (summarizing SEC position).
8. Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1288 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 913 (1970); see also Brief for SEC as Intervenor, Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip.
Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) (citing dicta from Second Circuit in Globus).
9. Wis. STAT. § 180.059 (1987-88), renumbered, Wis. STAT. § 180.0859 (1991-92).
10. Although the policy statement of § 180.0859 is unique, other states incorporate non-
exclusive indemnification provisions that provide liberal indemnification rights where the di-
rector or officer has acted in good faith and "in a manner he reasonably believed to be in or
not opposed to the best interests of the corporation." See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a)
(1992); RMBCA § 8.51(a) (1983); see also Wis. STAT. § 180.0851 (1991-92) (mandating broad
indemnification under different language). These statutes, and the bylaw provisions modeled
after them, presumably encompass federal securities liabilities to the extent that indemnifica-
tion is permissible. See Lavet, supra note 2, at 409-14.
11. See BISHOP, supra note 1, 9.05.
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ties incurred as a result of their position in the corporation. 2 Thus, in-
demnification is generally provided for in a corporation's bylaws or
through separate indemnity agreements between the corporation and its
managers. Corporate indemnification is subject to the competing con-
cerns of: (1) protection of the system of corporate governance; (2) pro-
tection of the corporation and its stakeholders; and (3) protection of
directors and officers. 3
The law of the state of incorporation governs a corporation's internal
affairs; thus, states commonly regulate and provide for indemnification
of directors and officers in their corporation laws. 4 State indemnifica-
tion statutes evolved primarily because of the states' interest in insuring
that liabilities imposed on directors and officers would not deter compe-
tent individuals from serving as managers.' 5 Additionally, the higher
threshold of director and officer liability imposed through corporate in-
demnification protects the use of business judgment by the manage-
ment. 6 Thus, state regulation of indemnification focuses primarily on
the protection of directors and officers.
Although the state has a legitimate, heightened interest in indemnifi-
cation as a result of its corporate chartering power,'7 the federal govern-
ment also has an interest in regulating the scope of corporate
indemnification. 8 The federal government's interest is primarily in pro-
tecting the system of corporate governance, the corporation, and stake-
holders of the corporation.'9 Consequently, corporate indemnification
invokes the competing concerns of the federal and state governments.
Wisconsin law has followed the general trend, providing liberal rights
of indemnification to corporate directors and officers.20 Wisconsin
broadly mandates indemnification of directors and officers, while al-
12. The other primary method for protecting corporate managers is through director and
officer liability insurance (D&O insurance). See generally BIsHoP, supra note 1, ch. 8.
13. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
14. See generally KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 3, § 20.04.
15. OLSON & HATCH, supra note 6, § 4.05. For example, the Wisconsin Special Commit-
tee on Liability Law and Insurance expressed concern that, without additional statutory pro-
tection of directors and officers, recruitment and retention of competent managers would
remain difficult, corporations would change their incorporation to states with more favorable
indemnity laws, and Wisconsin's ability to attract new businesses would be reduced. WISCON-
SIN LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, DESCRIPTION OF 1987 ASSEMBLY BnuL 301, at 9 (1987).
16. See Dale A. Oesterle, Limits on a Corporation's Protection of its Directors and Of-
ficers from Personal Liability, 1983 Wis. L. REv. 513, 560-61 (1983).
17. KNEPPER & BALEY, supra note 3, § 20.04; OLSON & HATH, supra note 6, § 4.04[1].
18. OLSON & HATH, supra note 6, § 4.04[1]; see also Oesterle, supra note 16, at 559-61.
19. See infra part II (discussing SEC position on indemnification).
20. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
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lowing corporations to expand or limit the right of its managers to in-
demnity.2' Section 180.0851(1) of the Wisconsin statutes provides for
mandatory indemnification of reasonable expenses incurred in success-
fully defending an action on the merits or otherwise.22 Where a director
or officer is unsuccessful, subsection (2)(a) mandates indemnification of
corporate managers for liabilities2 incurred as a result of their corporate
responsibilities, unless the liability was incurred because of a breach of
duty which constitutes:
1. A willful failure to deal fairly with the corporation or its share-
holders in connection with a matter in which the director or
officer has a material conflict of interest.
2. A violation of the criminal law, unless the director or officer
had reasonable cause to believe that his or her conduct was
lawful or no reasonable cause to believe that his or her conduct
was unlawful.
3. A transaction from which the director or officer derived an im-
proper personal profit.
4. Willful misconduct.24
Section 180.0852 provides that a corporation may opt out, or limit its
obligation to indemnify under the broad default provisions of section
180.0851.2 Additionally, the Wisconsin statutes provide that corpora-
tions may expand director and officer indemnification rights under sec-
tion 180.0851, subject to the four enumerated prohibitions.2 6
In 1987, the Wisconsin legislature enacted a statute which expressly
provides for indemnification of corporate managers against liabilities in-
curred under the federal securities laws.27 Section 180.0859 provides:
(1) It is the public policy of this state to require or permit indem-
nification, allowance of expenses and insurance for any liability
incurred in connection with a proceeding involving securities reg-
21. See Wis. STAT. §§ 180.0850-180.0859 (1991-92). The Wisconsin mandatory indemnity
statute is one of the most liberal of any state's corporate indemnification provisions. See
BISHOP, supra note 1, ch. 6 (comparing state statutes).
22. Wis. STAT. § 180.0851(1) (1991-92).
23. Wis. STAT. § 180.0851(2)(a) (1991-92). The term "liabilities" is defined to include
judgments, settlements, penalties, and reasonable expenses. Wis. STAT. § 180.0851(4) (1991-
92).
24. Wis. STAT. § 180.0851(2)(a) (1991-92); cf. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a) (1992);
RMBCA § 8.51(a) (1983) (parallel standard under different language).
25. Wis. STAT. § 180.0852 (1991-92).
26. Wis. STAT. § 180.0858 (1991-92). This provision of the Wisconsin statutes is, in effect,
largely redundant as § 180.0851(2) includes indemnification of all liabilities incurred by direc-
tors and officers in their capacity as corporate managers, subject to the four enumerated
prohibitions. See Wis. STAT. § 180.0851(2).
27. Wis. STAT. § 180.059 (1987-88), renumbered, Wis. STAT. § 180.0859 (1991-92).
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ulation described under sub. (2) to the extent required or permit-
ted under ss. to 180.0858.
(2) Sections 180.0850 to 180.0858 apply, to the extent applicable
to any other proceeding, to any proceeding involving a federal or
state statute, rule or regulation regulating the offer, sale or
purchase of securities, securities brokers or dealers, or investment
companies or investment advisors.28
Section 180.0859 provides no substantive right of indemnification, but it
is a reiteration of public policy in Wisconsin.29 The right of indemnifica-
tion under section 180.0859 is premised on a right contained in the other
indemnity provisions of the Business Corporation Laws, namely section
180.0851 (mandatory indemnification) 30 and section 180.0858 (permis-
sive additional indemnification).31
The right to indemnification under the Wisconsin statute for liabili-
ties under federal securities law is not, therefore, absolute, but is limited
by the four exclusions enumerated in section 180.0851(2).32 These limits
are significant in reconciling the antithetical Wisconsin statute and SEC
policy.33
28. Id.; cf. supra note 10.
29. The language of § 180.0859 provides for indemnification against securities liabilities
under §§ 180.0850 to 180.0858, but does not itself establish a right of indemnification. Wis.
STAT. § 180.0859. This application has led some commentators to suggest that § 180.0859 is
"poor drafting because the provision is redundant, is probably ineffective and may be confus-
ing." DRAFrER'S NoTm FROM THE LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE BUREAU, Letter from Suzanne
L. Hagopian to Don Dyke (Feb. 10, 1987). This statement was, however, removed from the
final Note to the Wisconsin Legislature. DRAFMR'S NoTE FROM THE LEGISLATIVE REFER-
ENCE BUREAU, Letter from Suzanne L. Hagopian to Don Dyke (Apr. 10, 1987).
30. Wis. STAT. § 180.0851 (1991-92); see supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
31. Wis. STAT. § 180.0858 (1991-92).
32. See Wis. STAT. § 180.0851(2)(a). In its analysis of Wisconsin Assembly Bill 301, the
Legislative Reference Bureau noted that current law permits indemnification when the direc-
tor or officer has acted in good faith and in a manner he or she believed to be in the best
interests of the corporation. Wis. A.B. 301, Analysis by the Legislative Reference Bureau
(1987). With respect to criminal violations, the standard is whether the officer or director had
reasonable cause to believe the conduct was unlawful. Id. This language is not applied in the
codified indemnification provisions of §8 180.0850 to 180.0859. Cf. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 145(a) (1992); RMBCA § 8.51(a) (1983). Therefore, its application as a practical limit on
indemnification is somewhat unclear. See discussion infra part V (submitting as standard for
permissible indemnification).
33. See infra part V (suggesting that such an implicit limit in the Wisconsin provisions is
fundamental in reconciling the positions of the SEC and the Wisconsin legislature). This anal-
ysis is equally applicable to other state statutes, and bylaw provisions modeled after them, that
encompass indemnification of federal securities liabilities. See supra notes 10, 32.
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II. THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION'S POSITION
Corporate indemnification of directors and officers may impede the
federal government's ability to regulate corporations. 34 As a result,
codified and uncodified public policy limitations are imposed to restrict
corporate indemnification. 5 One such limitation is the SEC's long-
standing position that indemnification of directors and officers for fed-
eral securities law violations is against public policy. 36 This position is
premised on the view that the federal securities laws are intended to
stimulate diligence and deter violations, and that indemnification would
undermine these objectives.37
The broad purpose cited for the federal securities laws is deterrence.
Congress created the SEC following the enactment of the Securities Act
of 193338 and the Securities Exchange Act of 193439 (Securities Acts) to
further establish regulations and police the securities industry.40 The
regulatory pattern which preceded the Securities Acts was a fragmented
system of state laws that facilitated abuses and securities fraud.41 The
SEC has contended that "the overriding purpose of Congress was not so
much to impose liability for the benefit of investors injured by a defec-
tive registration statement but rather to stimulate diligence on the part
of those persons who are actually responsible for the preparation of re-
gistration statements. ' 42 Therefore, "[a] fundamental purpose, common
to [the Securities Acts], was to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure
34. OLSON & HATCH, supra note 6, § 4.04[1]; Oesterle, supra note 16, at 560-61.
35. An example of a codified limit is § 180.0851(2), which prohibits indemnification where
liability is imposed on the basis of a breach of duty owed to the corporation, and the breach
constitutes enumerated conduct. Wis. STAT. § 180.0851(2) (1991-92). An uncodified limit,
based on policy concerns, is the premise that agents can not be reimbursed by their principles
for fraudulent or willful violations. FLOYD R. MEcHEM, OuTiLrNES OF THE LAW OF AGENCY
§§ 570-73 (4th ed. 1952).
36. Items 510, 512 of Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.510, 229.512(h)(3) (1994); see
BISHOP, supra note 1, 7 9.05.
37. See cases cited supra note 8.
38. The Securities Act of 1933 primarily adapted a disclosure philosophy by requiring
registration of distributions of securities with the SEC. Louis Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SE-
CURITIEs REGULATION 36 (2d ed. 1988).
39. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 addresses post-distribution trading and focuses
on continuous disclosure. Id.
40. See Loss, supra note 187, ch. ID.
41. Id. ch. 1B; see Louis Loss, The Conflict of Laws and the Blue Sky Laws, 71 HARv. L.
REv. 209 (1957).
42. Brief for SEC as Intervenor, Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F.
Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), quoted in BISHOP, supra note 1, 9.10.
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for the philosophy of caveat emptor and thus to achieve a high standard
of business ethics in the securities industry."43
The Securities Acts44 do not directly address the issue of indemnifica-
tion of directors and officers. 45 Regulation S-K, however, states the
SEC's position:
Insofar as indemnification for liabilities arising under the Securi-
ties Act of 1933 may be permitted to directors, officers or persons
controlling the registrant pursuant to the foregoing provisions,
the registrant has been informed that in the opinion of the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission such indemnification is against
public policy as expressed in the Act and is therefore
unenforceable.46
Although the SEC's position is expressly limited to the Securities Act of
1933, the policy statement has generally been interpreted to apply to
both Securities Acts.47
The SEC position is implemented in two ways.48 The first method of
implementation is through the SEC's discretionary power to grant or
deny acceleration of the effective date of registration.49 Item 512 re-
43. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963).
44. This Comment is limited to the Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934, which contain the
relevant federal securities provisions affecting directors and officers. See BISHOP, supra note
1, 9.13 (listing pertinent director and officer liability provisions of the Securities Acts).
45. The Investment Company Act of 1940 and the Trust Indenture Act of 1939 do, how-
ever, provide limited treatment of indemnification. Loss, supra note 187, at 1035-36.
46. Item 510 of Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.510 (1994); see also 17 C.F.R.
§ 229.512(h)(3)(1994).
47. See BISHoP, supra note 1, 9.13. For example:
There is nothing in the regulations under the 1933 Act, to indicate the Commission's
views, if any, on the validity of provisions for indemnification against liability or ex-
pense incurred in connection with litigation under the other federal securities statutes
which it administers, although there seems to be no very obvious reason why its policy
should be different with respect at least as to liability under the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934.
Id. at 29; see, e.g., Heizer Corp. v. Ross, 601 F.2d 330 (7th Cir. 1979) (expanding the SEC
policy to provisions of the 1934 Act); but cf. OLSoN & HATCH, supra note 6, § 6.03[3] (citing
precedent that the purpose of some provisions of the 1934 Act is compensatory).
48. Corporate indemnification provisions also are disclosed to the SEC through the proxy
regulations that require corporations with securities registered under the Exchange Act to
seek stockholder approval of agreements, bylaws, or charter amendments on indemnification.
Loss, supra note 187, at 1037 n.134.
49. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.512, 230.461 (1994). The importance of acceleration to corpora-
tions has been noted by commentators:
As a final step in the registration process, companies set a price of the securities in light
of current market data and amend the registration statement to reflect this price. The
1933 Act would normally delay the effectiveness of any registration statement for 20
days after any amendment is made, but, in recognition of the volatility of the markets
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
quires a corporation seeking acceleration to disclose in the registration
statement that it has been advised that in the SEC's opinion indemnifica-
tion of directors and officers for liabilities incurred under the federal
securities laws is against public policy and is, therefore, unenforceable.50
The regulation further requires disclosure to, and agreement with, the
SEC that upon a claim for such indemnification, "unless in the opinion
of [corporate] counsel the matter [of indemnification] has been settled
by controlling precedent," the corporation will submit to the judiciary
the question of whether such indemnity would violate public policy.51
These requirements are generally referred to as the Johnson & Johnson
formula.52
The second method applies to corporations not seeking acceleration
under Item 512.53 Item 510 requires disclosure of the SEC position
against indemnification in the prospectus, in conjunction with "a brief
description of the indemnification provisions relating to directors, of-
ficers and controlling persons of the registrant against liability arising
under the Securities Act."54 This shareholder disclosure provision dif-
fers from the requirements of the Johnson & Johnson formula under
Item 512.11 Presumably, the disclosure provision is an attempt to compel
compliance through the threat of shareholder derivative action when in-
demnification contrary to the SEC position is contemplated. 6
Although the SEC opposes indemnification against federal securities
liabilities, it has not similarly opposed reducing director or officer expo-
sure to federal securities liability through director and officer liability
insurance (D&O insurance) or contribution. Rule 461 states that insur-
ance against federal securities liabilities, whether paid for by the corpo-
ration, the insured, or a third party, is not considered a bar to
acceleration of the registration date.5 7 Contribution under federal secur-
and the instability of the pricing data, the Commission has the discretion to accelerate
the effective date of the registration statement so that the pricing and sale of the securi-
ties may take place almost simultaneously.
OLSON & HATCH, supra note 6, § 6.03[1]n.7; see Loss, supra note 187, at 128-29; BISHOP,
supra note 1, 9.08. Because of this price instability, most public corporations are forced to
seek acceleration, and thus, comply with Item 512. Id.
50. 17 C.F.R. § 229.512(h)(3)(1994).
51. Id.
52. The reference is based on an early registration statement in which the requirements
were applied. Loss, supra note 187, at 129 n.21.
53. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.510 (1994).
54. Id.
55. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
56. See generally BISHOP, supra note 1, 91 9.14 (discussing purpose of disclosure).
57. 17 C.F.R. § 230.461(c) (1994).
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ities law is also not precluded by the SEC based upon provisions in the
Securities Acts.5 8 "Those civil liability provisions of the 1933 and 1934
Acts that contemplate more than one defendant do contain provisions
on contribution." 9 In addition to the regulatory provisions on contribu-
tion, contractual and implied rights of contribution have generally been
held to support the policy of the federal securities laws. °
The SEC's position that indemnification undermines the deterrent
policies of the Securities Acts is not in itself law, but is the policy opinion
of a federal agency.61 Therefore, the effectiveness of the SEC's position
as a limit on corporate indemnification depends on the extent federal
securities laws prohibit indemnification or preempt state indemnity
laws.62
IL STANDARD FOR FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF STATE
INDEMNITY LAWS
The SEC's position on indemnification of directors and officers raises
the issue of whether or not state indemnity laws may be preempted
based on the purported conflict with the underlying purposes of federal
securities laws. It is well-settled that regulations promulgated by a fed-
eral agency may preempt state law.63 Preemption is not, however, lightly
presumed, but is based on the intent of the act or regulation.64 The in-
tent to preempt can be either express, or inferred from "the pervasive-
ness of the federal scheme, the need for uniformity, or the danger of
58. See Section 11(f) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(f) (1988); Sections 9(e) and 18(b) of
the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i(e), 78r(b) (1988).
59. Loss, supra note 187, at 1036; see also infra note 60.
60. BISHOP, supra note 1, 9.10; see also Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Ins., 113
S. Ct. 2085 (1993) (implied right to contribution in a Rule 10b-5 action as a matter of federal
law). Contribution generally supports the public policy of the Securities Acts because it facili-
tates compensation of injured parties and prevents the injustice of imposing a penalty on only
some who merit it. Globus, Inc. v. Law Research Serv., Inc. (Globus II), 318 F. Supp. 955,
(S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 442 F.2d 1346 (2d Cir. 1971), cert denied, 404 U.S. 941 (1971); see also
Heizer Corp. v. Ross, 601 F2d 330, 334 (7th Cir. 1979).
61. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
62. Similar to the Wisconsin provisions on indemnification, the actual application of the
SEC policy statement enables the opposing positions to be reconciled. See supra note 33 and
accompanying text; see also infra part V.
63. See Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141 (1982). "When
Congress gives an administrator or agency discretion to regulate a field of commercial activity
the agency's decision to preempt state regulations should be upheld unless it is clear that
Congress would not have sanctioned a preemption of state authority in the area regulated by
the agency." JoHN E. NOWAK ET AL., CoNsTrruTIONAL LAW § 9.4, at 299 n.5 (3d ed. 1986).
64. See New York State Dep't of Social Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405 (1973).
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conflict between the enforcement of state laws and the administration of
federal programs. "65
The conflict between the policies of the federal Securities Acts and
state indemnity law initially appears to constitute a basis for preemp-
tion.66 However, the federal and state systems of corporate and securi-
ties regulation coexist. Federal law does not exercise complete dominion
in the field of securities, and the states reserve broad powers to regulate
within the industry.67 Still, as one commentary has noted:
[e]ven where Congress has not entirely displaced state regulation
in a specific area, state law is preempted to the extent that it actu-
ally conflicts with federal law. Such a conflict arises when compli-
ance with both federal and state regulations is a physical
impossibility.... or where state law stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives
of Congress.'
Under this standard, state corporate regulations may be preempted by
the federal securities laws to the extent an actual conflict exists, or where
the state act effectively undermines the policy underlying the federal reg-
ulations.69 Thus, the preservation of state regulation of indemnification
depends on balancing the competing concerns of indemnification and
regulation.7 °
65. NowAK Er AL., supra note 63, § 9.4, at 299 (footnotes omitted); see Pacific Gas &
Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 203-04
(1983).
66. The Securities Acts' cited policy of deterrence appears to conflict with state indemnifi-
cation. See supra part II; see also Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238 (1984), reh'g
denied, 465 U.S. 1074 (1984), on remand, 769 F.2d 1451 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S.
1104 (1986), quoted in NowAK ET AL., supra note 63, § 9.4, at 299 n.5 (noting that state law is
invalid if it "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress").
67. Loss, supra note 187, at 8; see, e.g., Baker, Watts & Co. v. Miles & Stockbridge, 876
F.2d 1101, 1106-08 (4th Cir. 1989) (discussing limited federal preemption of state indemnifica-
tion by Securities Acts).
68. NowAK ET AL., supra note 63, §9.4, at 300 (quoting Pacific Gas & Elea Co., 461 U.S.
at 204).
69. Cf. Section 28(a) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1988) ("The rights and reme-
dies provided by this chapter shall be in addition to any and all other rights and remedies that
may exist at law or in equity .... ); see also Baker, Watts & Co., 876 F.2d at 1108 (holding that
the "right to indemnification may not be preempted in each and every circumstance"); King v.
Gibbs, 876 F.2d 1275, 1279 n.5 (7th Cir. 1989) (noting defendant waived claim for indemnifica-
tion under Delaware law).
70. Oesterle, supra note 16, at 560-61 (discussing problem posed by federal preemption of
state law and balancing thresholds of liability); see also BISHOP, supra note 1, § 9.06, at 12
(positing the issue of whether liabilities imposed by Congress and the SEC are "so severe that
a court will sympathize with an attempt to restore more comfortable modes of doing busi-
ness?"). Although the judiciary evaluates the validity of an indemnification agreement or
1052 [Vol. 78:1043
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IV. JUDICIAL RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICr
The SEC's current position has been stated for over forty years, 71 yet
there has been no square judicial holding on whether the position
preempts the states' right to govern corporate indemnification. 72 The
SEC's position is not law.73 Thus, whether state-regulated indemnifica-
tion is preempted by the Securities Acts is based on the judiciary's case-
by-case attempt to balance the competing concerns of indemnification
and regulation.74 The cases may be distinguished based on the issue in-
volved: (1) the right to indemnification; (2) the indemnification of legal
expenses; (3) the indemnification against egregious securities violations;
and (4) the indemnification against negligent and strict liability securities
violations.
A. The Right To Indemnification Under Federal Securities Law
One of the few issues the courts have concurred on, albeit for differ-
ent reasons, is the lack of any implied right to indemnification under the
Securities Acts. However, the courts have divided on the rationale for
disallowing an implied right of indemnification against liabilities im-
posed under the federal securities laws.75
A majority of the courts have denied implied indemnification based
on the underlying policies of the federal securities laws, in conjunction
with the absence of any such remedy in the laws and regulations. In
Heizer Corp. v. Ross,76 the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's
dismissal of cross-claims for indemnity against liabilities imposed under
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5
thereunder.77 The court stated "[w]hereas contribution supports the pol-
icy of securities legislation, indemnification tends to frustrate and defeat
statute in light of the federal law, it has not held that public policy precludes all indemnifica-
tion. See, e.g., cases discussed infra part IV.D.
71. SEC Release No. 33-3519, 19 Fed. Reg. 6729 (Oct. 11, 1954), codified at 17 C.F.R.
§§ 229.510, 229.512(h)(3) (1993).
72. BisHop, supra note 1, 9.10.
73. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
74. See supra parts I-II. Balancing the competing concerns resolves (1) permissibility and
(2) preemption of indemnification against federal securities law violations, since both are gov-
erned by the underlying policy of the federal securities laws. See supra part H (discussing
standard for preemption).
75. This division creates ambiguity as to the reconciliation of indemnification for securi-
ties violations, and demonstrates the inherent difficulty in formulating a resolution in light of
the competing policies and issues of preemption. See discussion infra part V.
76. 601 F.2d 330 (7th Cir. 1979), modified, King v. Gibbs, 876 F.2d 1275 (7th Cir. 1989).




it. A securities wrongdoer should not be permitted to escape loss by
shifting his [or her] entire responsibility to another party. ' T The court
additionally supported its holding, citing the general principle of indem-
nification: a person charged with seriously wrongful conduct is barred
from restitution.79 Lastly, the court of appeals held, whereas the Securi-
ties Acts provide for some measure of contribution, they do not provide
for indemnification. 0 A majority of the federal circuit courts have fol-
lowed the Heizer Corp. decision and its policy-based logic.8'
Alternatively, some courts have held that no right to indemnification
exists, while expressly ignoring the role of public policy. In King v.
Gibbs, 2 the Seventh Circuit modified its position in Heizer Corp.3 In
King, a corporate controller sought indemnification from the corpora-
tion and other defendants for liabilities imposed under Section 10(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 thereunder.s4 The court
noted the controller did not seek indemnity pursuant to a contract.
Thus, the court held indemnification would be available only if a right
could be implied, or alternatively as a matter of federal common law. 5
78. Heizer Corp., 601 F.2d at 334; see also Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d
1276, 1288 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970) (holding that "'it would be against
the public policy embodied in the federal securities legislation to ... enforce [the] indemnifica.-
tion agreement"' (quoting Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 287 F. Supp. 188, 199
(S.D.N.Y. 1968)).
79. Heizer Corp., 601 F.2d at 334 (citing REsTATEmENT OF RESmTT ON § 88 (1937)).
80. Heizer Corp., 601 F.2d at 334-35.
81. "Courts have rejected indemnity for a variety of securities violations because indem-
nity contravened 'the public policy enunciated by the federal securities laws."' First Golden
Bancorporation v. Weiszmann, 942 F.2d 726,728 (10th Cir. 1991) (quoting 2 A. BROMBERG &
L. LowENFELs, SECURITIES FRAUD & COMMODITIES FRAUD (2d ed.) § 5.7 (277), at 5:82:78);
see Baker, Watts & Co. v. Miles & Stockbridge, 876 F.2d 1101, 1108 (4th Cir. 1989) (part of
holding based on policy); Stewart v. American Int'l Oil & Gas Co., 845 F.2d 196,200 (9th Cir.
1988); Stowell v. Ted S. Finkel Inv. Servs., Inc., 641 F.2d 323, 325 (5th Cir. 1981), reh'g denied,
647 F.2d 1123 (5th Cir. 1981); Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath v. Horwitch, 637
F.2d 672, 676 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 963 (1981); Globus, 418 F.2d at 1288 (es-
tablishing framework for Heizer Corp. analysis).
82. 876 F.2d 1275 (7th Cir. 1989).
83. Id. at 1282-83; see also Baker, Watts & Co., 876 F.2d at 1104-06 (part of holding based
on implied right analysis). In modifying its position, the Seventh Circuit noted that the ulti-
mate result remained "consistent with the only other circuit court cases dealing with the ques-
tion of indemnification in the context of the federal securities laws." King, 876 F.2d at 1282;
but cf. infra part V (analyzing the limits of public policy and preclusion of indemnification
under federal securities laws).
84. King, 876 F.2d at 1276; 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988); SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.Rt
§ 240.10b-5 (1993).
85. King, 876 F.2d at 1278-79. The court limited the controller's claim to federal law,
holding that the state claims for indemnification were waived by failure to rely on Delaware
law in the district court. Id. at 1279 n.5.
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In King, the court of appeals did not base its decision on the underly-
ing policies of the Securities Acts, as in Heizer Corp.,86 but instead deter-
mined whether a right to indemnification existed. 7 In dismissing the
possibility for remedy under an implied right, the court applied the four-
part "implied right of action test" set forth in Cort v. Ash.88 In light of
the Cort test, the court held that Congress did not intend to create a
private right of action for indemnification, nor were Section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 enacted for the "especial benefit" of corporate directors and
officers.8 9 Therefore, no implied private cause of action for indemnifica-
tion exists under the statute or the rule.90 The court also dismissed any
federal common law claim for indemnification, noting the general lack of
federal common law remedies.91
B. Indemnification of Legal Expenses
Unlike the right to indemnification, the permissibility of corporate
reimbursement of director and officer expenses incurred in defending
against an action brought under the federal securities laws is unclear.
The SEC's position excludes from its "against public policy" language
86. Heizer Corp. v. Ross, 601 F.2d 330, 334 (7th Cir. 1979).
87. The court expressly dismissed policy concerns in determining the existence of an im-
plied right to indemnification. King, 876 F.2d at 1283.
88. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975); King, 876 F.2d at 1279-82. The Court in Cort estab-
lished a four-part test to determine whether a private right of action should be implied from a
statute:
First, is the plaintiff "one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was en-
acted," ... ? Second, is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit,
either to create such a remedy or to deny one? Third, is it consistent with the underly-
ing purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff? And
finally, is the cause of action one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically
the concern of the States, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action
based solely on federal law?
Id. at 1280 (quoting Cort, 422 U.S. at 78 (citations omitted)). The Seventh Circuit further
noted the decision of the Supreme Court in California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287,298 (1981),
which places the principal consideration of the Cort test on congressional intent. King, 876
F.2d at 1281-82.
89. King, 876 F.2d at 1281. The legislative history of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 dem-
onstrates that the fundamental concern of the drafters was protection of investors, rather than
the protection of directors and officers. Id.
90. Id. at 1282.
91. Id. The court cited Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), for the premise
that there is generally no federal common law. King, 876 F.2d at 1282. TWo exceptions are
where a federal rule is necessitated to protect a federal interest, and where Congress provides
the courts with the power to develop substantive law. Id. However, "[t]he right to indemnifi-
cation falls into neither of those categories." Id.
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and the Johnson & Johnson formula9' expenses "incurred or paid by a
director, officer or controlling person of the registrant in the successful
defense of any action, suit or proceeding."93
This position has not been interpreted by the courts,94 and raises two
issues: (1) what constitutes a "successful" defense, and (2) does the
SEC's enumerated position preclude indemnification of expenses in-
curred in an unsuccessful defense.95 The first concern is whether a de-
fendant who prevails on grounds other than the merits is entitled to
indemnification.96 Some commentators submit that indemnification of
expenses is permissible only when an action is successfully defended on
the merits.97 Others have interpreted the provision as requiring mere
success.98 The lack of guidance by the SEC and the courts may be some-
what clarified by the Commission's position on indemnification of ex-
penses incurred in an unsuccessful defense, as set forth below.99
The second issue is whether indemnification against expenses in-
curred in an unsuccessful defense is permissible. Indemnification against
expenses incurred by a director or officer in the unsuccessful defense of
92. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
93. Item 512 of Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.512(h)(3) (1994); see Goldstein v. Alodex
Corp., 409 F. Supp. 1201 (E.D. Pa. 1976); see also BIsHop, supra note 1, 9.09 (discussing SEC
position on expenses and the issues raised by the position).
94. BsiSoP, supra note 1, 9.09; cf. Heffernan v. Pacific Dunlop GNB Corp., 965 F.2d 369
(7th Cir. 1992); Citadel Holding Corp. v. Roven, 603 A.2d 818, 826 (Del. 1992) (discussing
right to advances for reasonable expenses pursuant to a contract, but not addressing the ulti-
mate right to indemnification of such expenses).
95. BisHoP,, supra note 1, 9.09.
96. The short statute of limitations provided in Section 13 of the Securities Act, for exam-
ple, constitutes such a basis. See id. The Wisconsin provision mandates indemnification for
reasonable expenses incurred where the director or officer has been "successful on the merits
or otherwise." Wis. STAT. § 180.0851(1) (1991-92).
97. BISHOP, supra note 1, 9.09 (citing 3 Loss, SEcuRrrIms REGULATION 277-83 (2d ed.
1961)).
98. BISHoP, supra note 1, 9.09.
Item 512 of Regulation S-K contains no [merit] limitation, and the very existence of
Section 13 would seem to indicate that one who is eligible for its benefits ought to be
able to take them without being penalized by losing his or her status as a "successful"
defendant and thereby whatever right he or she might have to be indemnified for ex-
penses-which will probably be much less than if he or she had to litigate the issues on
the merits.
Id. Requiring success on the merits, thus, places pressure on directors and officers to pursue
litigation to a final resolution, rather than settling or seeking dismissal. See id.
99. Permissive indemnification of expenses incurred successfully defending on grounds
other than the merits arguably should not be precluded if unsuccessful defense expenses are
indemnifiable. See infra notes 101-05 and accompanying text.
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an egregious securities violation would likely be prohibited.100 However,
the SEC has suggested that indemnification for some unsuccessful de-
fense expenses is permissible. In an amicus curiae brief submitted in a
bankruptcy action,10 1 the SEC stated: "Indemnification for costs in-
curred in the defense of the good faith exercise of their business judg-
ment is an appropriate and necessary expense in order to attract
qualified persons to serve in that capacity."'1 2 The judiciary has also
indicated that indemnification of unsuccessful defense expenses would
be sustained. 3 In Commissioner v. Tellier,'° the United States
Supreme Court held that public policy does not prohibit an income tax
deduction for expenses incurred in the unsuccessful defense of criminal
charges under the Securities Act of 1933.105
C. Indemnification Against Egregious Securities Violations
The courts have concurred on the issue of whether corporate indem-
nification against federal securities liabilities requiring culpability
greater than ordinary negligence is permissible. In Globus v. Law Re-
search Serv., Inc.,06 the Second Circuit established the fundamental
principle that such indemnification is against public policy and is, there-
fore, impermissible, and any such agreement is unenforceable.10 7
In Globus, the Second Circuit was confronted with an underwriter's
claim for indemnification from the issuing corporation for liabilities im-
posed by Section 17(a) of the 1933 Act and Section 10(b) of the 1934
Act.'08 The underwriter sought indemnification pursuant to a contrac-
tual provision for indemnity between the corporation and the under-
writer.' 0 9 The court dismissed the claim for indemnification on the basis
that the contract violated public policy, citing both the SEC position and
the rudimentary rule that reimbursement is prohibited for reckless, will-
100. See infra part IV.C (discussing permissibility of corporate indemnification against
egregious securities law violations); see also infra note 117 and accompanying text.
101. Brief for SEC, In re Baldwin-United Corp., 43 B.R. 443 (S.D. Ohio 1984).
102. Brief for SEC at 2-3, quoted in Baldwin-United Corp., 43 B.R. at 447.
103. See BISHOP, supra note 1, 9.10; KNEPPER & BALY, supra note 3, § 20.02.
104. 383 U.S. 687 (1966).
105. Id. at 694-95; but cf BISHOP, supra note 1, 9.10, at 20 (stating, "perhaps the Court
would have given less weight to the desirability of enabling defendants in civil suits to procure
the best possible defense.").
106. 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970).
107. Id. at 1288-89. The rule established in Globus is in accord with the SECs position on
indemnification. See supra part I (discussing SEC position).
108. Id. at 1278-79; 15 U.S.C. §§ 77q(a), 78j(b) (1988).
109. Globus, 418 F.2d at 1287; see also id. at 1287 n.14 (quoting the text of indemnity
clause).
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ful, or criminal misconduct. 110 However, the Second Circuit stated: "[I]t
is important to emphasize at the outset that at this time we consider only
the case where the underwriter has committed a sin graver than ordinary
negligence.""'1 The court concluded that the underwriter's actual
knowledge of material misstatements, as found by the district court, con-
stituted sufficient culpability to preclude indemnification against the se-
curities violations under the rule." 2
Globus is one of the few cases that deals with indemnification against
federal securities violations pursuant to a contract, 3 and is the case
cited most often for the proposition that indemnification is not available
under the federal securities laws." 4 Indeed, no circuit court has at-
tempted to limit the policy holding of Globus,"5 and some courts have
sought to expand it." 6 As one commentator noted: "It is safe to assume
that individuals held liable for fraudulent or willful misrepresentation in
a registration statement would not be entitled to recover litigation ex-
penses from the corporation, much less the amount of the judgment
against them, under even the most generous [state indemnity]
statute. ' 117
D. Indemnification Against Negligent and Strict Liability
Securities Violations
The judiciary's response to indemnification of liabilities imposed
under the federal securities laws in cases where the director or officer's
culpability falls below the focus of Globus"' has been both inconsistent
and marked with ambiguity.
110. Id. at 1288-89. The Second Circuit held that prevention, not compensation, is the
policy behind the securities laws. Id. Additionally, the court noted that corporate indemnifi-
cation economically injures shareholders. Id.
111. Id. at 1288 (emphasis added).
112. Id.
113. Most of the cases which the judiciary has dealt with are attempts by parties to be
indemnified as an implied right. See, eg., cases discussed supra part IV.A.
114. See OLSON & HATCH, supra note 6, § 6.03[3].
115. See generally BisHoP, supra note 1, 9.06.
116. See Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 387 F. Supp. 163 (D. Del. 1974), vacated
on other grounds, 535 F.2d 761 (3d Cir. 1976); Odette v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., Inc., 394 F.
Supp. 946 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (relying on dicta of Globus to prohibit indemnification against
liability incurred under negligent securities law provision).
117. BISHOP, supra note 1, 9.06, at 11.
118. Globus, 418 F.2d at 1288 (holding expressly limited to "sin[s] graver than ordinary
negligence.").
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In Globus, the Second Circuit provided dicta on the issue of indemni-
fication against negligent securities violations.11 9 Several courts and the
SEC have subsequently relied on these statements.2 0 The Globus court
stated that the fundamental goal of the Securities Act of 1933 was not to
compensate, but rather to promote enforcement and deter negligence,
and that the "in terrorem effect" of securities liability would be thwarted
by indemnification121-including violations of Section 11 of the 1933
Act.122
Some courts have sought to expand the "above ordinary negligence"
rule of Globus"z by restricting indemnification against even negligent
securities violations. In Gould v. American-Hawaiian Steamship Co.,124
the district court held that the purpose of Section 14(a)'2 is regulatory,
not compensatory, and "[o]nly a realistic possibility of liability for dam-
ages will encourage due diligence .... ,126 As a result, the court resolved
that indemnity is impermissible and would "vitiate" the deterrence pur-
pose of Section 14(a).127
The holding in Gould was further expanded in Odette v. Shearson,
Hammill & Co., Inc." s In Odette, the court precluded indemnification
against liabilities imposed under Rule 10b-5, Sections 12(2), 15(c), and
119. Id. at 1288-89.
120. See Odette, 394 F. Supp. at 954-55; see also Brief for SEC as Intervenor, Feit v.
Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) (reliance by SEC on
Globus dicta).
121. Globus, 418 F.2d at 1288 (quoting 3 Loss, SEcunrrms REGULATION 1831 (2d ed.
1961)).
122. Globus, 418 F.2d at 1288. Section 11 of the Securities Act imposes a standard of
ordinary negligence. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1988).
123. 418 F.2d at 1288-89.
124. 387 F. Supp. 163 (D. Del. 1974), vacated on other grounds, 535 F.2d 761 (3d Cir.
1976).
125. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1988). Section 14(a) regu-
lates proxy regulations, and Rule 14a-9 establishes liability for false or misleading statements
in proxies. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1994).
126. Gould, 387 F. Supp. at 168; but cf id. at 167 ("most of the cases on indemnity under
the Securities Acts can be read to support the proposition that an unsuccessful defendant may
obtain indemnity from one significantly more responsible . ").
127. Id. at 168. The Gould court's decision was based on indemnity as a matter of com-
mon law, not on a contract or bylaw provision. Id. at 166 n.4. Furthermore, the court presum-
ably prohibited application of the broad Delaware indemnity statutes by holding that
indemnification in securities cases is a matter of federal law. Id. at 167 n.7; but cf Koch Indus.,
Inc. v. Vosko, 494 F.2d 713, 725 (10th Cir. 1974) (indemnification under the laws of the Com-
monwealth of the Bahamas); King v. Gibbs, 876 F.2d 1275, 1279 n.5 (7th Cir. 1989) (defendant
waived claim for indemnification under Delaware law).
128. 394 F. Supp. 946 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
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17(a) of the 1933 Act.'29 The court based its prohibition on the Globus
rule, holding that Rule 10b-5, Section 17(a), and Section 15(c) required a
showing of knowledge or reckless disregard for the truth.130 Addition-
ally, the court noted that Section 12(2) imposes strict liability subject to
the reasonable-care defense,13' and ultimately reasoned that the public
policy objections to indemnification cited in Globus 32 extended to indi-
vidual federal securities laws requiring only negligent conduct.133
In First Golden Bancorporation v. Weiszmann,134 the Tenth Circuit
addressed both implied and contractual indemnification against Section
16(b) 35 insider trading liabilities. 36 The court in First Golden Bancor-
poration denied any implied right to indemnity under Section 16(b), be-
cause indemnification would contravene "the public policy enunciated
by the federal securities laws.' 1 37 The court held that the deterrence
concerns cited by other jurisdictions applied to Section 16(b), although
Section 16(b) does not require any proof of fraudulent intent. 38 Thus,
the court opined that the public policy of Section 16(b)1 39 prohibited
129. Id. at 954-56; 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1994); 15 U.S.C. §§ 771, 77q(c), 77o (1988).
130. Odette, 394 F. Supp. at 954-56. This requirement of scienter precludes any indemnifi-
cation under the Globus rule. See Globus, 418 F.2d at 1288-89; see also discussion supra part
Iv.C.
131. Odette, 394 F.Supp at 956. The standard of Section 12(2) is in essence ordinary negli-
gence. Id.
132. Id. at 956; see also Globus, 418 F.2d at 1288-89 (purpose of Securities Acts is
deterrence).
133. Odette, 394 F. Supp. at 957. "Indemnification must also be denied to encourage the
reasonable care required by § 12(2)." Id. However, the district court relied on the indemni-
tee's egregious conduct. Thus, the court limited its holding by sidestepping the issue of preclu-
sion of indemnification for merely negligent conduct; "[i]f Shearson were held liable under
§ 12(2) on a showing of mere negligence, [Globus] might not necessarily preclude the court
from awarding indemnification." Id. at 956; see id at 954 n.9 ("relevant fact" is egregious
culpability); but cf. Arden Way Assoc. v. Boesky, 664 F. Supp. 863, 865 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (in-
demnification against federal securities violations depends on questions of fact pertaining to
relative culpability); Adalman v. Baker, Watts & Co., 599 F. Supp. 752,754-55 (D. Md. 1984).
134. 942 F.2d 726 (10th Cir. 1991).
135. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1988).
136. First Golden Bancorporation, 942 F.2d at 728-29.
137. Id. at 728 (quoting 2 A. BROMBERG & L. Lowr NELs, SEcuRrriEs FRAUD & CoM-
MODrriEs FRAIJ § 5.7 (277), at 5:82:78). The court, however, limited the scope of its opinion
to Section 16(b). First Golden Bancorporation, 942 F.2d at 729 n.2.
138. Id. at 729. The purpose of Section 16(b) was to deter transactions with a high poten-
tial for fraud. Id.
139. "We find a 'clear congressional intent to provide a catch-all, prophylactic remedy,
not requiring proof of actual misconduct ... ."' Id. (quoting L. HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURi-
TIS REGULA TION § 12.3, at 417 (1985)).
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"any attempt by an insider to seek indemnification for his liability under
section 16(b)." 14 °
The legal precedent set by the case-by-case judicial review of permis-
sible indemnification of directors and officers is difficult to discern, since
many of the cases brought to the judiciary deal with implied rights of
indemnification. 141 Further, the federal circuit courts have not substan-
tially embraced the reasoning and broad extension of the Globus rule
sought in Gould and Odette.142 Some courts have held that indemnifica-
tion is permissible where liability is imposed as a matter of law.1 43 The
Seventh Circuit has also suggested that indemnification may not be pro-
hibited where the difference in the penalty imposed and degree of culpa-
bility are too disparate. 44
140. First Golden Bancorporation, 942 F.2d at 729 (emphasis added). The term "any"
includes express contractual indemnification based on the court's citation of Bunker Ramo-
Eltra Corp. v. Fairchild Indus., Inc., 639 F. Supp. 409, 419 (D. Md. 1986), dismissed without
opinion, 801 F.2d 393 (4th Cir. 1986) (agreement to indemnify against Section 16(b) liability is
void as against public policy); see also Diamond v. Oreamuno, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1969), cited in
Lavet, supra note 2, at 414 (director found liable for insider trading cannot be deemed to have
acted in good faith and in a manner not opposed to the best interests of the corporation).
141. See cases cited supra part IV.A.
142. See Baker, Watts & Co. v. Miles & Stockbridge, 876 F.2d 1101, 1108 (4th Cir. 1989)
("right to indemnification may not be [rejected] in each and every circumstance"); King v.
Gibbs, 876 F.2d 1275,1279 n.5 (7th Cir. 1989); OLSON & HATcH, supra note 6, § 6.03[3]; but cf.
Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath v. Horwitch, 637 F.2d 672, 676 (9th Cir. 1980),
cerL denied, 452 U.S. 963 (1981) (denying right of indemnification under Section 12(2) of the
1933 Act, relying on Gould). Additionally, neither case precludes indemnification pursuant to
an agreement or statute where the director's or officer's culpability is low. See supra notes
126-27, 133. Indeed, the district courts subsequently adopted a test based on the relative cul-
pability of the director or officer. See Arden Way Assoc. v. Boesky, 664 F. Supp. 863, 865
(S.D.N.Y. 1987) (permissible indemnification is a question of fact based on a director or of-
ficer's personal fault, actual knowledge, contribution to the injury, and whether the liability is
imputed or vicarious); Adalman v. Baker, Watts & Co., 599 F. Supp. 752, 754-55 (D. Md.
1984).
143. Arden Way Assoc., 664 F. Supp. at 865; Maryville Academy v. Loeb Rhoades & Co.,
Inc., 530 F. Supp. 1061, 1071 (N.D. Ill. 1981); Thomas v. Duralite Co., Inc., 386 F. Supp. 698,
727-28 (D. N.J. 1974), affd in part, vacated in part, 524 F.2d 577 (3d Cir. 1975), affd without
opinion, 559 F.2d 1209 (3d Cir. 1977); cf. Greenwald v. American Medcare Corp., 666 F. Supp.
489, 493 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (defendant entitled opportunity to prove that he or she is without
fault); Odette v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., Inc., 394 F. Supp. 946, 957 n.14 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)
(no resolution of whether defendant held liable without fault may recover indemnity); but cf.
EDWARD BRODSKY & M. PATRICIA ADAMsIU, LAW OF CORPORATE OFncIERS AND DIREC-
ToRs: RiGHTS, DUTms, AND LIABIar § 19:07 (1984) (vicarious liability under the Securi-
ties Acts is based on controlling person provisions which require some culpability).
144. See Madigan, Inc. v. Goodman, 498 F.2d 233, 237-38 (7th Cir. 1974); see also id, at
238 ("If the... plaintiffs are too culpable to be entitled to indemnification, they may nonethe-
less be entitled to contribution.").
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Additional uncertainty has resulted from the courts' parallel resolu-
tion of whether state indemnity laws are preempted by the federal secur-
ities laws to the extent they permit indemnification against nonegregious
federal securities violations. The ambiguous precedent set by the federal
circuit courts in Baker, Watts & Co. v. Miles & Stockbridge45 and King v.
Gibbs'1 establishes the possibility of preemption, but does not provide
the limits of such preemption. 47
In Baker, Watts & Co., the Fourth Circuit held that no implied right
of indemnification existed under Section 12(2) of the 1933 Act." 8 The
court then considered the plaintiff's pendent state-law indemnity
claims. 4 9 Citing the policy concerns raised in Globus, the Fourth Circuit
held that the state law claims for indemnification were preempted by
federal law.' However, the court continued, noting: "[a]lthough a
right to indemnification may not be preempted in each and every cir-
cumstance, we reject plaintiff's assertion that the federal policy against
indemnification extends only to intentional wrongdoing."''
Similarly, in King, the Seventh Circuit held that no implied or com-
mon law right of indemnification exists under the Securities Acts.' 5 In
King, the court held that the cross-claim for indemnification under Dela-
ware law was waived by the defendant. 53 Further, the court noted that
in Koch Industries, Inc. v. Vosko, 54 the Tenth Circuit recognized a right
to indemnification under non-federal law.'55
145. 876 F.2d 1101 (4th Cir. 1989).
146. 876 F.2d 1275 (7th Cir. 1989).
147. See supra part III (preemption limited to where state law conflicts with or under-
mines the fundamental purpose of the federal law).
148. Baker, Watts & Co., 876 F.2d at 1104-06; 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1988).
149. Baker, Watts & Co., 876 F.2d at 1106-08.
150. Id. at 1108. "[I]t would run counter to the basic policy of the federal securities laws
to allow a securities wrongdoer such as Baker, Watts to shift its entire responsibility for fed-
eral violations on the basis of a collateral state action for indemnification." Id.
151. Id. Thus, the court failed to establish any standard for preemption below the culpa-
bility of the Globus rule, but instead relied on the "plainly adjudicated" wrongdoing of the
plaintiff. Id.
152. King, 876 F.2d at 1283.
153. Id. at 1279 n.5. The court here, similar to Baker, Watts & Co., failed to establish any
standard for preemption, while implying that indemnification under state law may not be
preempted.
154. 494 F.2d 713, 725 (10th Cir. 1974).
155. King, 876 F.2d at 1283 n.12. The court again intimates that indemnification may not
be preempted by the federal securities laws. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
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V. ANALYSIS
Although the public policies cited by the Wisconsin legislature and
the SEC appear to be diametrically opposed, the actual application of
the statute and the federal securities laws can be reconciled. The issue
raised by the Wisconsin statutes on indemnification is: to what extent is
statutorily sanctioned corporate indemnification of directors and officers
permissible? 5 6 Section 180.0859 has not been challenged by the SEC,
nor have the courts addressed the issue of the section's permissibility. 5 7
The resolution of the conflict is unclear based on the judiciary's limited
treatment of indemnification against federal securities liabilities. Any
reconciliation must take into account the fragmented judicial resolve, as
well as the fundamental, competing concerns of indemnification. 5 8
Indemnification under section 180.0859 is likely permissible to the
extent it does not undermine the underlying policies of the federal secur-
ities laws. The federal securities laws enjoy limited preemption of state
law; however, state indemnity law is preempted only to the extent that
the provision actually conflicts with or undermines the federal law.' 59
The policy opinion of the SEC is not dispositive, in and of itself, since it
is merely the opinion of a federal agency. However, whether a state law
effectively conflicts with or undermines federal law is based on the un-
derlying policy of the individual law or regulation. 60
Deterrence is cited as the underlying policy of a majority of the pro-
visions of the Securities Acts applicable to directors and officers. 161
This position has been posited by the SEC,162 Congress, 63 and the
courts.164 Although indemnification cases have generally held that de-
156. The same issue arises as to contractual rights to indemnification, and is common to
other states' laws as well. See supra notes 10, 74; supra part I (Wisconsin provision is a policy
statement only, not a substantive right to indemnification); see also BISHOP, supra note 1, ch. 6
(summarizing state statutes and adoption by many states of non-exclusivity provisions).
157. See supra note 11.
158. The SEC, through the Johnson & Johnson formula, recognizes that the judiciary must
provide the ultimate resolution. See supra text accompanying notes 50-52; see also infra note
173.
159. See supra part III.
160. Id.; see also discussion supra part IV.D.
161. See BISHOP, supra note 1, 9.13 (listing provisions of Securities Acts which bear
particular relevance to director and officer liability).
162. Brief for SEC as Intervenor, Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F.
Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
163. H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 3, 5, 9 (1933).
164. See eg., Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1289 (2d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970).
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terrence is the policy behind the individual securities provisions, there is
authority to the contrary.165
Courts have often considered that the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act are
closely related for purposes of construction. 166 However, other than the
1934 Act's antifraud provisions, "[t]he methodology of the 1934 Act-
full disclosure of material information to shareholders on a timely ba-
sis-may itself form the principal deterrent to wrongdoers, making the
primary goal of enforcement under the Act compensatory rather than
punitive."'167 Thus, if the purpose of specific regulations of the Securities
Acts is not deterrence, but compensation, indemnification pursuant to
an agreement or state statute would not undermine these regulations. 16
The SEC's broad prohibition of indemnification and concern for de-
terrence is further compromised by related provisions of the securities
regulations. The express allowance of D&O insurance169 and contribu-
tion 70 somewhat undermines the purported strict deterrence purpose of
the Securities Acts.171 Furthermore, the SEC's Johnson & Johnson
formula of Item 512172 recognizes that the judiciary maintains the ulti-
mate authority to preclude indemnification, thus implicitly suggesting
that limited indemnification may be permissible.17 3
165. See OLSON & HATCH, supra note 6, § 6.03[3] (citing congressional and judicial au-
thority that deterrence is not, in fact, the policy underlying all of the provisions of the Securi-
ties Acts).
166. Id. (citing Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988); Globus, 418 F.2d at1286).
167. OLSON & HATcH, supra note 6, § 6.03[3] (footnotes omitted); see Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976) (comparing the principal purposes of the Securities Acts
as cited in H.R. Rm,. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1-5 (1933) and S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong.,
2d Sess. 1-5 (1934)).
168. See supra part III (standard for federal preemption applicable to Securities Acts).
169. Rule 461 of Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 230.461(c) (1994).
170. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
171. Contribution, in most cases, supports the purposes of the Securities Acts. See supra
note 170. However, allowance of insurance appears to undermine those provisions of the
Securities Acts that claim deterrence as the underlying purpose. Thus, some commentators
have noted the irony between the SECs position on indemnification and insurance:
"If it is against public policy for directors to make contractual arrangements relieving
themselves of fear of liability for negligent violations of the 1933 Act, that public policy
should forbid insurance.... But it has never been thought in such other contexts as
automobile insurance that the role of civil liability in deterring careless driving makes it
illegal for drivers to insure themselves against liability."
OLSON & HATCH, supra note 6, § 6.03[3], (quoting Joseph W. Bishop, Jr., New Problems in
Indemnifying and Insuring Directors: Protection Against Liability Under the Federal Securities
Laws, 1972 DUKE L.J. 1153, 1165).
172. 17 C.F.R. § 229.512(h)(3) (1994); see supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
173. Upon a claim for indemnification, a corporation agrees to, "unless... the matter has
been settled by controlling precedent, submit to a court of appropriate jurisdiction the question
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Another consideration in weighing the undermining effect of indem-
nification on the Securities Acts' provisions is whether the necessity of
regulatory deterrence is diminished by other forms of corporate control.
Deterrence of egregious managerial conduct is derived, in part, from the
"market for corporate control."1 74 The securities industry has become
increasingly sophisticated since the 1930s, and the market is recognized
as providing substantial control over director and officer conduct.175
Thus, market efficiency provides additional managerial regulation
through stock price adjustments, stockholder coups, and the threat of a
takeover.176
To the extent that the purpose of the Securities Acts is held to be
deterrence, the issue is whether indemnification undermines this pur-
pose. The Wisconsin indemnity statutes preclude indemnification for
self dealing, criminal violations, improper personal profits, and willful
misconduct. 17 7 These restrictions run parallel to the egregious conduct
of the Globus rule.1 78 However, the Wisconsin mandatory provision,1 7 9
unlike other states' statutory indemnification provisions, contains no
general conduct limitation such as "good faith" and "in a manner he
reasonably believed to be in or not opposed to the best interests of the
corporation."1 8 0 Therefore, based on the concurrence among the federal
courts, Wisconsin statutory permission for indemnification for egregious
whether such indemnification by it is against public policy .... " 17 C.F.R. § 229.512(h)(3)
(emphasis added). The italicized language implies that indemnification may not be preempted
or precluded in all cases.
174. See RicHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 14.7 (4th ed. 1992); see
also Dennis Honabach & Roger Dennis, The Seventh Circuit and the Market for Corporate
Control, 65 Cfu.-KErNT L. REv. 681 (1989); Richard S. Ruback, An Economic View of the
Market for Corporate Control, 9 DEL. J. CORP. L. 613 (1984).
175. "If management is disregarding the shareholders' interests, the market price of the
firm's common stock will fall." POSNER, supra note 174, § 14.7, at 412.
176. In balancing the policies of the SEC and the protection of corporate managers, the
existence of additional controls should be considered to determine the scope of the purpose of
the regulations, and their current application. See supra part III (preemption limited based on
underlying purpose of federal law).
177. Wis. STAT. § 180.0851(2) (1991-92).
178. Globus precluded indemnification for violations of federal securities laws where the
director or officer's scienter was above ordinary negligence. Globus, 418 F.2d at 1288-89.
179. Wis. STAT. § 180.0851(2).
180. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a) (1992); RMBCA § 8.51(a) (1983). Although the
express provisions of section 180.0851 do not contain such language, the Legislative Reference
Bureau has noted that the current application of the indemnification statutes is limited to
"good faith and in a manner he or she believed to be in the best interests of the corporation."
See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
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securities violations, should be preempted, and bylaw provisions
modeled after it should be found unenforceable.' 8'
The permissibility of indemnification against securities violations-
pursuant to the Wisconsin statutes or other agreements-which fall be-
low the egregious conduct standard of Globus likely depends on the cul-
pability of the director or officer. The courts have not prohibited all
indemnification of corporate managers for securities violations, but have
generally relied on the conduct of the director or officer.182 In Odette,'s
the court sidestepped the issue, relying in part on the egregious conduct
of the officer, even though liability was imposed under Section 12 of the
Securities Act-a negligence provision."s Additionally, the Southern
District of New York subsequently held that whether indemnification is
permissible depends on the specific culpability of the corporate man-
ager.'8 1 Similarly, in First Golden Bancorporation v. Weiszmann,'86 the
holding was limited to Section 16(b) violations,' s7 which are recognized
as never being committed in good faith or in the best interests of the
corporation.188
The reconciliation of the contrary positions, therefore, depends on
establishing an appropriate threshold of liability which promotes the de-
terrence purposes of the Securities Acts,189 as well as the state's legiti-
mate interest in providing indemnity: 9 °
Once more we must apply our tests of good faith, fair dealing, and
maintenance of reasonable standards. Assuming that in a particu-
lar case the tests of good faith and fair dealing have been satis-
fled, we must proceed to investigate the area of permissible
181. Based on both the express and implied limitations of section 180.0851(2), such in-
demnification is unlikely under the statute. See Wis. STAT. § 180.0851(2); supra note 180 and
accompanying text.
182. See, e.g., Baker, Watts & Co. v. Miles & Stockbridge, 876 F2d 1101, 1108 (4th Cir.
1989) ("Although a right to indemnification may not be preempted in each and every circum-
stance, we reject plaintiffs assertion that the federal policy against indemnification extends
only to intentional wrongdoing."); Globus, 418 F.2d at 1288-89 (holding limited to conduct
above ordinary negligence).
183. Odette v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., Inc., 394 F. Supp. 946 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
184. Id. at 956; see supra note 133.
185. Arden Way Assoc. v. Boesky, 664 F. Supp. 863, 865 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); see also
Adalman v. Baker, Watts & Co., 599 F. Supp. 752, 754-55 (D. Md. 1984).
186. 942 F.2d 726 (10th Cir. 1991).
187. Section 16(b) of the 1934 Act imposes strict liability. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1988).
188. First Golden Bancorporation, 942 F.2d at 729; see also Diamond v. Oreamuno, 301
N.Y.S.2d 78 (1969), cited in Lavet, supra note 2, at 414 (violation of Section 16(b) never in
good faith or not opposed to the best interests of the corporation).
189. BisHoP, supra note 1, 9.06; see Oesterle, supra note 16, at 560-61.
190. Oesterle, supra note 16, at 560-61; see supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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relaxation of standards. Are the standards imposed by the fed-
eral legislation so high that the lowered ceiling which is to be sub-
stituted will still be equal to or above normal levels of business
conduct? Are the liabilities imposed by Congress so severe that a
court will sympathize with an attempt to restore more comforta-
ble modes of doing business? 191
Some commentators suggest that the standard of negligence imposed
by provisions of the Securities Acts, particularly in light of the "reason-
able care" defense, is not so high as to permit modification.192 However,
as noted above, the federal courts have not embraced a strict prohibition
against indemnification. 193 Further, the public policy of deterrence is not
likely to be undermined by indemnification of directors and officers who
act in good faith and in a manner not opposed to the best interests of the
corporation. 94
Imposing a standard of good faith, fair dealing, and nonopposition to
the interests of the corporation would establish an appropriate balance
between the purposes of the federal securities laws and the states' inter-
est in providing liberal rights of indemnification to directors and of-
ficers.19 Applying the broad indemnification provisions of the
Wisconsin Business Corporation Laws, subject to this standard and the
express limitations of section 180.0851(2),96 comports with the rule set
forth in Globus and the limited judicial precedent under other provisions
of the Securities Acts.'97 Indemnification against liabilities imposed
under the federal securities laws should, therefore, be permissible where
the conduct of a director or officer complies with this standard.
Moreover, there is support for permitting indemnification against un-
successful defense expenses under the above standard. Both the SEC
191. BisHoP, supra note 1, 9.06, at 12; see Oesterle, supra note 16, at 560-61.
192. Oesterle, supra note 16, at 560-61. Note however, not all liability imposed under the
Securities Acts is subject to a "reasonable care" defense.
193. See, eg., cases discussed supra part IV.D.
194. This is particularly true in light of the compromised deterrent purpose of the federal
securities laws and the legitimate policy of providing an adequate standard of protection to
directors and officers. See supra notes 167-76 and accompanying text.
195. As noted, it is unlikely that indemnification of conduct which complies with such a
standard would undermine the Securities Acts; while it concurrently satisfies the state and
private requirements of protection of corporate managers. See supra part I. RMBCA, as well
as Delaware and other states, expressly incorporate such a standard for indemnification of
directors and officers. See RMBCA § 8.51(a) (1983); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a) (1992);
BISHOP, supra note 1, ch. 6-7; see also supra note 180 (standard is implicit in § 180.0859 of the
Wisconsin statutes).
196. Wis. STAT. § 180.0851(2) (1991-92).
197. See cases discussed supra notes 182-87.
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and the judiciary have suggested such a standard as being necessary for
the protection of directors and officers,198 and no court has barred in-
demnification where the director or officer meets the "good faith" and
other requirements of state law.199
CONCLUSION
Section 180.0859 of the Wisconsin Business Corporation Laws cites
the public policy of the state on corporate indemnification against liabili-
ties incurred under the federal securities laws. The enforceability of the
provision or similar agreements is currently unclear, as the statute has
not been challenged. The statute directly contradicts the public policy
statement of the SEC. Although the judiciary has not provided a full
resolution of the conflict, the current precedent and efforts to balance
the competing interests provide a foundation for reconciling the oppos-
ing policy statements.
Indemnification is permissible only to the extent that it does not con-
travene public policy or the policies of the Securities Acts. Whether in-
demnification of managerial conduct undermines these policies depends
on establishing an appropriate threshold of liability. The implicit stan-
dard of good faith, fair dealing, and non-opposition to the interests of
the corporation satisfies judicial precedent and provides an appropriate
balance between federal regulation and state indemnification. There-
fore, indemnification for federal securities violations under the broad
provisions of the Wisconsin statutes, or pursuant to an agreement or an-
other state's corporate indemnity laws, is likely permissible to the extent
that it complies with such a standard.
DAvID B. ScHuLz
198. See supra part IV.B.
199. BISHOP, supra note 1, 9.11; see also id. at 23 ("After all, lawyers' bills, however
painful, are not usually intended to be a punishment or deterrent.").
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